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An interactional model of stress that integrates current research on competitive aþ ects and emphasizes the
temporal dimensions of the stress process is forwarded. The literature reveals that the study of athletes’  aþ ective
responses to competition has been narrowly focused on pre-competitive anxiety. Equivocal ® ndings on temporal
patterning of competitive anxiety suggest that a fundamental change in the empirical approach is needed because
the current conceptualization of anxiety and other complex emotions is imprecise. The analysis of secondary
emotions as patterns of discrete basic emotions, as suggested by diþ erential emotions theorists, is proposed for
consideration in future research. In this view, competitive anxiety is considered as a set of patterns of emotions
rather than a unitary aþ ect. The adoption of this approach could result in better operationalization of com-
petitive anxiety as well as other secondary performance-related emotions. We propose that research on competi-
tive aþ ects should follow two parallel lines. The ® rst should focus on the description of complex emotional states
that re¯ ect the idiosyncratic emotional experience and vocabulary of the athlete. The second should examine the
sets of basic emotions experienced throughout competition, and focus on individual diþ erences and factors
determining those diþ erences. The integration of the two approaches could lead to a better understanding
of whether, how and why individuals diþ er in the interpretation of speci® c secondary emotions and their eþ ect
on performance. Moreover, it would permit the analysis of intra-individual variations in labelling secondary
emotions with respect to diþ erent competitive contexts and temporal aspects.
Keywords: aþ ect, CSAI-2, diþ erential emotions theory, individual zones of optimal functioning model, review.
Introduction
Athletic competition places many demands on parti-
cipants’  physical and psychological resources. The
large number of people involved in competitive sport,
and the signi® cance of victories and defeats related
to it, render modern athletic competition extremely
stressful. To explain and predict the eþ ects of com-
petition on athletes’  behaviour, sport performance and
emotional reactions, an interactional approach to the
study of this form of stress has been adopted by several
researchers (e.g. Sanders, 1983; Jones, 1990; Hardy
et al., 1996).
Stress is conceptualized as a process of transaction
between individuals and their environment (Lazarus
and Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1999). The current review
introduces an interactional model of competitive stress
* Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed. e-mail:
ester.mataija@ntu.ac.uk
that integrates research on competitive emotions and
emphasizes the temporal dimensions of the stress pro-
cess (Fig. 1). The stress and coping aspects of the model
are an adaptation of the interactional models of stress
of Hardy et al. (1996) and Lazarus (1999). Some of
the temporal components of Hanin’ s (1997) individual
zones of optimal functioning model have also been
adopted. The interactional model of competitive stress
encompasses the relations among the competition,
the athlete’ s appraisal of it and the athlete’ s emotional
response, coping and performance. The competition
is de® ned by three situational variables ±  demands,
constraints and opportunities. Demands consist of the
set of behaviours, skill and attitudes that are necessary
for a successful performance. Constraints de® ne what
an athlete should not do. These are also backed up with
punishment if violated. For instance, with the exception
of the Davis Cup, tennis players are not allowed to
seek help or suggestions from their coaches during the
course of a match. In most sports, players are not
Journal of Sports Sciences, 2000, 18, 605± 626
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Fig. 1. Interactional model of stress as applied to athletic competition.
allowed to voluntarily in¯ ict harm to their opponents.
Opportunities arise from fortunate timing or depend
on the individual’ s ability to recognize an opportunity.
These relate to the positive consequences for the
athlete’ s future life and career derived from a successful
performance.
All these characteristics of the competition in¯ uence
the athlete’ s emotional reaction through the process of
appraisal. Appraising constitutes the set of conscious
and unconscious processes of evaluating the subjective
importance of the competitive event and the ability
to cope with it (Lazarus, 1999). Appraisal is thought to
in¯ uence the quality and intensity of the emotions
evoked by a competitive event, which in turn aþ ect
the athlete’ s behaviour and performance (Lazarus and
Folkman, 1991; Jones, 1995). Lazarus et al. (1980)
de® ned emotions as complex organized psycho-
physiological reactions to events, agents or objects,
consisting not only of cognitive appraisals, but also
action impulses and patterned somatic reactions. These
three components are postulated to operate as a unit
rather than separately. The patterning of these com-
ponents is considered to re¯ ect the quality and the
intensity of the emotion.
Coping, the third component of the athlete’ s psycho-
logical reaction, relates to the way the athlete manages
competitive conditions that are stressful. Coping has
two major functions. Problem-focus coping relates to
actions aimed at changing the reality of the troubled
person± environment relationship. In this case, the
coping actions may be directed to either the self or
the environment (Lazarus, 1999). To illustrate, an
athlete who predicts defeat in a future competition
may work on his or her skills or try to improve the
equipment. In contrast, emotion-focused coping is
aimed at regulating the emotions tied to the stress
without changing the realities of the stressful situation.
The athlete may try to avoid thinking about the com-
petition or may try to reappraise its importance.
The model in Fig. 1 views stress, emotion and coping
as existing in a part± whole relationship. They belong
together and form a conceptual unit. Separating them
is justi® ed only for convenience of analysis because the
separation distorts the phenomena as they appear in
nature (Lazarus, 1999).
Psychological reactions to competition vary con-
siderably from one individual to another (Jones, 1990).
These individual diþ erences are moderated by both
personal and situational factors. The former include,
for example, personality traits such as competitive trait
anxiety (Gould et al., 1984; Nordell and Sime, 1993)
and perfectionism (Hall et al., 1998), sex (Singh and
Brar, 1988; Jones and Cale, 1989; Jones et al., 1991),
skill (Huddleston and Gill, 1981; Perkins and Williams,
1994), perceived readiness (Lane et al., 1997) and
achievement goals (Hall et al., 1998). Situational
factors include the type of sport (Krane and Williams,
1987; Mann et al., 1988), competitive stress (Nordell
606 Cerin et al.
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and Sime, 1993; Man et al., 1995), environmental
conditions (Jones et al., 1990; Lane et al., 1997),
personal relationships and group cohesion (Prapavessis
and Carron, 1996).
One of the fundamental assumptions of the inter-
actional model of stress is that stress and the individual
reactions to it are to be considered as a process that
unfolds over time. This is because emotions, appraisal,
coping strategies and situational variables during a
stressful encounter are characterized by change. For
instance, an individual may initially feel scared and then,
after a few moments, angry, then guilty, then distressed
(Folkman and Lazarus, 1985). The sequence of feelings
experienced re¯ ects both the changing meaning of
what is happening as the stressful encounter unfolds
and the eþ ectiveness of the coping strategies adopted.
To consider just one period or combine together stages
of a stressful encounter provides a limited picture of
what is happening and would not allow an analysis
of why something is happening.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, besides stress itself being
considered an ever-changing process that unfolds over
time, all of the components of the model include a
temporal dimension. First, opportunities that charac-
terize a competitive event depend on the timing of the
event with respect to the athlete’ s career stage, current
readiness and health (Lazarus, 1999). Secondly, speci® c
emotional reactions vary in duration and frequency
(Hanin, 1997). Individuals diþ er in the tendency
(frequency and duration) to experience a particular
emotional state or set of emotional states in com-
petition. Thirdly, athletes’  emotional states and coping
depend on the timing of the assessment with respect to
the competitive event (pre-, mid- or post-competition).
Fourthly, personal variables such as age, skill and
competitive experience, which are thought to in¯ uence
appraisal and, therefore, emotional experience, develop
and change over time. Finally, the duration of the com-
petitive event is thought to determine the accuracy
of prediction of self-referenced performance from
athletes’  pre-competitive emotional state (Terry, 1995)
and the quality and variability of athletes’  emotional
experience during the competition (Hanin, 1995). The
above emphasizes the need to explore the various
temporal aspects of the stress process in athletic competi-
tion, from the temporal aspects of emotional responses
to the temporal dimensions of the antecedents and
correlates of emotional responses.
Consequently, the main aim of this review is to pro-
vide a critical synthesis of the literature on the temporal
patterning of competition-related emotional states and,
on these grounds, to develop an interactional model
of stress in line with the existing psychological frame-
works. Since investigations have mainly focused on
pre-competitive anxiety, much of the current review
discusses conceptual and methodological issues
related to this speci® c emotion. Because, until recently,
researchers have neglected other competition-related
emotions, not much relevant empirical evidence could
be analysed. This lack of information can be infor-
mative. By comparing the interactional model of stress
(Figs 1 and 2) with the empirical ® ndings presented
here, issues needing further investigation can be
identi® ed.
Temporal patterning of competitive anxiety
Unidimensional approach
Among the various aþ ects experienced by athletes
facing a competition, most research has focused on
anxiety, de® ned as an emotional state characterized by
tension, nervousness and apprehension, accompanied
by the activation of the autonomic nervous system
(Spielberger, 1976). In the 1980s, research was based
on a unidimensional approach that acknowledged the
need to distinguish between anxiety as a trait or dis-
position and anxiety as a transient state.
Table 1 summarizes the results of studies that
examined the temporal patterning of anxiety from a
unidimensional perspective. Most of these studies used
Spielberger’ s State± Trait Anxiety Inventory or the
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (Martens et al.,
1990). The latter is a version of the State± Trait Anxiety
Inventory adapted to sport settings. Table 1 reports
the average intensity of anxiety observed at diþ erent
times pre-, mid- or post-competition, the statistical
signi® cance of change in anxiety intensity between
assessments, and the moderators that were found to be
related to the intensity or the temporal patterning of
competitive anxiety (if available). This information is
crucial because it permits a better understanding of
the development of athletes’  pre-competitive emotional
experience and the factors and the mechanisms that
are related to it. Furthermore, a better understanding
of the temporal changes of athletes’  emotional states
and the underlying appraisal and coping processes
facilitates the planning of psychological interventions
aimed at optimizing individual performance and well-
being.
To illustrate, the time ´ locus of control and time ´
success± failure interaction eþ ects observed by Hall
(1980) (see Table 1) constitute a valuable piece of
information when planning psychological interventions
or predicting individual responses to competition.
Hall noted that internals (i.e. individuals who perceive
their own behaviour as the determinant of rewards
or punishments) exhibited a lower intensity of pre-
competitive anxiety than externals (i.e. individuals who
Temporal patterning of competitive emotions 607
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do not perceive their life outcomes to be related to
personal eþ ort or skill). This means that, in general,
externals may bene® t more than internals from anxiety-
reduction techniques pre-competition. However, the
opposite tendency was observed post-competition for
individuals who experienced failure. Internals scored
signi® cantly higher on post-competitive anxiety after
failure than externals. Additionally, externals showed
no signi® cant diþ erences whether succeeding or failing.
Consequently, in intervention planning, it is likely that
failing internals rather than failing externals would bene-
® t from an anxiety-reduction programme. Furthermore,
the fact that locus of control may diþ erentially modulate
the emotional response at various stages of the com-
petition indicates that the two types of individuals use
diþ erent coping strategies or base their appraisal on
diþ erent beliefs and hierarchies of motives. A further
exploration of the factors provoking these individual
diþ erences in emotional reaction would shed light on
the mechanisms underlying individual adaptation to
competitive stress (Hall, 1980). This example illustrates
that an analysis of the temporal changes in competitive
emotional states and their moderators permits a better
understanding of what is actually happening and the
reasons why it is happening. In doing this, it opens the
door to intentional and planned change for the better.
In general, analysis of the temporal patterning of
unidimensional competitive anxiety shows that, over
a one-week pre-competitive period, state anxiety
increased as competition neared (Huddleston and Gill,
1981; Durtschi and Weiss, 1984; Gal-or et al., 1986;
Huband and McKelvie, 1986; Donzelli et al., 1990)
(see Table 1). Gal-or et al. (1986) reported a signi® cant
increase in anxiety from 1 week to 1 day before the com-
petition. Further increments were seen 1 h and immedi-
ately before the start of the event. Also, Durtschi and
Weiss (1984) found that athletes’  anxiety declined
once the competition started. Interestingly, signi® cant
temporal changes were detected on the Distance
Runner Questionnaire, but not on the Competitive
State Anxiety Inventory. However, no data on the
validity of the Distance Runner Questionnaire were
reported. With regard to post-competition, a reduction
in anxiety has been reported immediately (Sanderson
and Reilly, 1983; Huband and McKelvie, 1986) and
1 day (Huband and McKelvie, 1986) after the event.
Personal variables (e.g. sex, experience, trait anxiety and
skill), situational variables (e.g. competitive stress) and
favourable versus unfavourable judging moderated the
intensity of competitive anxiety. Performance outcome
aþ ected post-competitive anxiety and its temporal
patterning. Finally, the amplitude of temporal changes
in intensity of anxiety appeared to be modulated by
state anxiety, performance outcome, locus of control,
experience and sex. The eþ ect of these factors on the
temporal patterning of anxiety or other competition-
related emotional states will be examined in greater
detail in the section pertaining to antecedents and
moderators of competitive aþ ects.
Multidimensional approach
In the 1990s, investigations of competitive anxiety
shifted from a unidimensional to a multidimensional
conceptualization of competitive state anxiety as a result
of the work of Martens et al. (1990). These researchers
developed the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2
(CSAI-2), which was originally designed to measure
the cognitive and somatic components of competitive
state anxiety. However, during the development of the
questionnaire, the authors encountered a third factor,
which they subsequently labelled s`elf-con® dence’.
Since the late-1980s, the CSAI-2 has been the most
frequently used tool in this ® eld of research.
Table 2 shows the ® ndings of studies on the temporal
patterns of the three subscales of the CSAI-2. When
available, we report mean somatic anxiety, cognitive
anxiety and self-con® dence at diþ erent assessments, the
statistical signi® cance of change between assessments
and the moderators that were found to be related to the
intensity or temporal patterning of the three dimensions
of competitive anxiety.
Somatic anxiety
Empirical results for the temporal patterning of the
CSAI-2 sub-components show that somatic anxiety
tends to increase rapidly close to the start of the com-
petitive event and dissipate once the competition is
over (Karteroliotis and Gill, 1987; Slaughter et al.,
1994). However, Caruso et al. (1990) did not observe a
reduction in somatic anxiety after competition even
in a successful group of competitors. To explain the
unexpected results, Caruso et al. (1990) suggested that
the task to which their participants were exposed
(45 s cycling at maximal speed) might have produced
a sustained increase in physiological arousal. This
observation questions the discriminant validity of the
somatic sub-scale for the assessment of the physiological
components of anxiety. Moreover, it is noteworthy that,
contrary to theoretical assumptions, Karteroliotis and
Gill (1987) found that the somatic anxiety measure of
the CSAI-2 was not related to selected physiological
measures of arousal. Indeed, the diý culty of deter-
mining a subjectively perceivable and reportable pattern
of autonomic nervous system activity that is unique to
speci® c emotions has been acknowledged many times
(e.g. Levenson, 1992). A rapid increase in heart rate,
for example, is by no means a physiological reaction
exclusive to anxiety. It is also associated with anger,
Temporal patterning of competitive emotions 609
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sadness (Levenson, 1992), joyful expectation, pleasant
excitement and unemotional states such as physical
eþ ort or increased attention (Frijda, 1986). It is possible
that some athletes who report intense physiological
symptoms accompanied by low cognitive anxiety do not
experience anxiety at all, but rather anger, deep interest,
excitement, increased eþ ort or attention. Therefore, it
is possible that the current somatic anxiety sub-scale
assesses physiological arousal associated with more than
one type of emotion or even non-emotional states. Con-
sequently, it should not be interpreted as a measure of
the intensity of somatic anxiety but rather as a measure
of perceived autonomic arousal. Unless clear perceivable
diþ erential somatic symptoms of anxiety are identi® ed,
the use of the concept of ` somatic anxiety’  is not justi® ed
because it cannot be clearly de® ned. Notably, although
many contemporary researchers of emotions agree that
speci® c biological changes accompany and provide the
substrate for diþ erent emotions, they also believe, with
the exception of Levenson (1994), that the autonomic
nervous system is unlikely to show much evidence
of emotion-speci® c patterning, especially for complex
emotional states such as anxiety (e.g. Davidson, 1994;
LeDoux, 1994).
Accordingly, we suggest that the assessment of general
autonomic and somatic activity may be meaningful
only if considered as an indirect index of the intensity
of emotional states that are contingent upon features of
urgency or diý culty (e.g. fear, interest, anger). It should
by no means be interpreted as an indicator of the
presence of a speci® c emotion. To evaluate the quality of
the emotional experience, cognitive appraisal (Lazarus,
1999) and action readiness (Frijda, 1986) have to be
examined. However, as noted earlier, in our attempts to
analyse emotional experience, we should never forget
that the three components of emotions are postulated to
operate as a unit and that separating them is justi® ed
only for convenience of analysis (Lazarus, 1999).
In summary, our ® ndings (Table 2) indicate that
athletes tend to experience a rapid increase in auto-
nomic arousal close to competition, which dissipates
once the competition is over. However, no conclusion
can be drawn about the emotions that underlie the
increase in arousal. The same arousal might be pro-
voked by fear, anxiety, anger, positive excitement,
shame± embarrassment or a combination of two or more
emotions.
Cognitive anxiety
Although theory predicts a rapid increase in the inten-
sity of physiological symptoms as athletes approach
the competitive event, the cognitive sub-component
of the CSAI-2 is believed to remain stable over time
unless the expectations of success change (Martens
et al., 1990). Analysis of the temporal changes of
cognitive anxiety has led to diþ erent ® ndings. In some
cases, the intensity of cognitive anxiety remained
stable over time (Gould et al., 1984; Caruso et al., 1990;
Wiggins, 1998), whereas in others it increased with
approach of the evaluative event (Swain and Jones,
1993; Slaughter et al., 1994; Davis and Gill, 1995;
Diez and Rosa, 1996; Hall et al., 1998). Moreover, when
present, the changes on the cognitive sub-scale were far
less pronounced than those on the somatic sub-scale
(Table 2). These results apparently support the con-
tention of Martens et al. that cognitive anxiety is more
stable over time than somatic anxiety. These con¯ icting
® ndings can be attributed in the main to two sources:
changes in athletes’  expectations of success or poor
psychometric characteristics of the instrument used.
With regards to the ® rst source, only one study has
analysed directly the temporal changes in expectancy of
success together with changes on the CSAI-2 sub-scales
(Table 2). Jones et al. (1991) showed that male athletes
did not exhibit signi® cant changes in cognitive anxiety
during the week before competition, whereas female
athletes did. However, both males and females reported
a signi® cant change in their expectations of success.
The rating of the strength of their opponents tended
to increase as the competition approached, while their
perceived readiness for the competition remained
stable.
Further inspection of the data reported in Table 2
shows that the moderators analysed in the reported
studies do not account for the diþ erences in ® ndings.
Therefore, it is possible that the diþ erences observed
are the result of poor psychometric characteristics of the
CSAI-2 or the eþ ects of other moderators that have yet
to be identi® ed. Indeed, the validity of the CSAI-2 as
a measure of competitive anxiety has recently been
questioned. Lane et al. (1999) evaluated the factor
structure of the inventory using con® rmatory factor
analysis and observed that the three-factor model
hypothesized by Martens et al. (1990) showed poor ® t
indices. Lane et al. (1999) suggested that a limitation
of the cognitive anxiety sub-scale might derive from
phrasing items around the word ` concerned’  rather than
`worried’ . Concern about an impending competition
does not necessarily mean that an athlete is experiencing
negative thoughts. It could also mean that the athlete
is acknowledging the importance and diý culty of the
competition and is trying to mobilize resources to cope
with it. In light of these ® ndings, Lane et al. concluded
that data obtained using the CSAI-2 are not to be
trusted until further validation studies have been com-
pleted and possible re® nements to the inventory have
been made.
To complicate the issue of the de® nition and measure-
ment of multidimensional competitive anxiety further,
Temporal patterning of competitive emotions 613
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several studies have revealed that not all athletes
consider the experiences listed in the CSAI-2 to be
negative. Jones and Swain (1992) found that athletes
sometimes perceived them as facilitating performance.
Moreover, they showed that highly competitive athletes
viewed their cognitive anxiety to be more facilitative
and less debilitative than less competitive athletes. In
an attempt to explain the new ® ndings, Jones et al.
(1996) examined the dispositional antecedents of the
directional interpretations that individuals tend to attach
to their cognitive and somatic anxiety. They showed that
positive aþ ect played a key role in the interpretation
of both cognitive and somatic anxiety. However, Jones
et al. did not mention that a diþ erent interpretation
of cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety might
indicate the presence of two qualitatively diþ erent
emotional experiences. Indeed, anxiety has been used to
describe an extremely broad spectrum of states ranging
from panic and immobilization to exhilaration (Jones,
1995). As Burton and Naylor (1997) noted, we are con-
fronted with the need to develop a more conceptually
explicit de® nition of competitive anxiety. There is a
compelling urgency for the identi® cation of measure-
ment strategies that would separate anxiety from other
more positive emotions with similar symptoms (e.g.
challenge). Therefore, the common and diþ erential
components de® ning emotional states of threat and
challenge should be identi® ed.
In our view, there is a solution to this problem.
Namely, to account for the individual and situational
diþ erences in experienced anxiety, Izard (1977) de® ned
anxiety not as a single emotion, but rather as a pattern of
emotions including fear and two or more of the emotions
of sadness, anger, shame± shyness, guilt and interest.
Although fear is considered to be an essential compon-
ent of the pattern of anxiety, the other fundamental
emotions are postulated to be variable elements. It is
hypothesized that individuals diþ er in the emotions they
experience, as part of their anxiety pattern, except that
fear is always included. Moreover, the combination of
emotions constituting anxiety is thought to vary with
relation to time, situations, personality and intensity and
frequency of subjective perceptions. Empirical research
(Bartlett and Izard, 1972) lends support to the premise
that fear is central to the experience of anxiety, and that
interest, guilt, anger and shame± shyness are frequent
components. Anxiety involves a cluster of emotions that
may motivate both approach and avoidance behaviours
(Buechler and Izard, 1980). Factor analytic studies have
shown that terms used to describe anxiety, as well as
items from clinical anxiety scales such as the State± Trait
Anxiety Inventory, consistently correlate most highly
with fear and share the next largest amount of variance
with a combined sadness± guilt factor (Izard and Young-
strom, 1996). Moreover, an empirical test of Cattell’ s
hypothesis that anxiety represents a higher-order factor
onto which more discrete emotions and cognitions load,
provided support for variations in the pattern of anxiety
(Izard and Youngstrom, 1996). That study discovered a
second-order factor that contained substantial loadings
for both fear and at least two of the other emotions
commonly accompanying fear in anxiety pro® les. These
emotions are interest, sadness, guilt and shyness,
with surprise, anger and disgust being less frequent.
The observed patterns of shared variance support
the assumptions of the theory of diþ erential emotions
that anxiety is a variable pattern of emotions and that
fear is the key emotion within the normative anxiety
pro® le.
Accounting for diþ erences in intensity of perceived
symptoms, these ® ndings suggest that individuals
assigning diþ erent interpretations to anxiety may in fact
experience diþ erent patterns of anxiety. Additionally,
it may be hypothesized that diþ erent patterns of anxiety
may aþ ect performance in diþ erent ways. In fact,
Frijda (1986) suggested that emotions are identi® ed
with action tendency change. Diþ erent modes of action
readiness correspond to diþ erent emotions, with many
emotions being de® ned by such modes. For instance,
anger is the urge to attack or, more properly, the urge
to regain freedom of action and control. Thus, it could
be hypothesized that fear accompanied by interest or
anger might lead to proactive behaviour or be a sign of
acceptance of, and confrontation with, the competitive
challenge (Fig. 2). Conversely, fear accompanied by
guilt, shame or sadness might be a sign of perceived
inability to cope, producing avoidance behaviour,
increased self-focus and poor concentration on the task,
thereby having a negative eþ ect on performance.
Whether fear is accompanied by shame, guilt, interest,
anger, sadness or other emotions depends on personal
and situational factors (Fig. 1), which in turn determine
the appraisal of the importance of the situation and the
individual’ s ability to cope. Note that Fig. 2 is part of the
interactional model of stress (emotional response com-
ponent) and represents only two of the many possible
patterns of emotions that an athlete can experience
during or before a competition. Other emotional
patterns could be more positive, represent a sense of
challenge and have instead i`nterest± excitement’  as
their dominant component, accompanied by feelings
of enjoyment, surprise, anger or contempt.
Because of the current confusion and lack of satis-
factory operational de® nitions of competitive anxiety,
we suggest that future research should examine various
forms of anxiety patterns that result from combinations
of fear with other discrete basic emotions (Izard and
Buechler, 1980). Discrete basic, primary or funda-
mental emotions are thought to be characterized by
distinctive universal signs (emotional expression) and
614 Cerin et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
6:4
8 0
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
3 
Fig. 2. Patterns of competitive anxiety and their eþ ect on sport performance. This diagram represents the emotional-response
component of the interactional model of stress. It illustrates only two of the many possible patterns of emotions that athletes
experience during, before or after competition.
antecedent events, presence in other primates, relative
coherence among response systems, distinctive physi-
ology (Ekman, 1992), presence in all cultures (Plutchik,
1994) or distinctive relational action tendencies (Frijda,
1986; Davidson, 1992). Thus, for instance, fear and
anger have distinctive universal facial expressions that
can easily be recognized by members of literate and
pre-literate cultures throughout the world. Additionally,
there is some evidence for similar facial expressions in
other primates (Ekman, 1992). There is also evidence
for distinctive patterns of autonomic nervous system
activity for fear and anger (Levenson, 1994). As far as
universal antecedents are concerned, if primary emo-
tions evolved to deal with fundamental life-tasks, then
it is sensible to expect that there will be some common
elements in the contexts in which emotions are found
to occur. Admittedly, there must be substantial inter-
and intra-individual diþ erences in the social context
that call forth an emotion, which is attributable to social
learning experiences. However, this learning is likely to
be biologically primed in the sense that the responses
are much more easily attached to one type of stimulus
than others. In the case of fear, the universal antecedent
event that triggers it is perceived physical or psycho-
logical danger (Izard, 1977). Anger can instead be
experienced upon exposure to a demeaning oþ ence
against the self (Lazarus, 1999), including psychological
and physical restraint that blocks one’ s freedom of
action, or upon exposure to painful stimuli (Izard,
1977). In terms of action readiness, fear is characterized
by the urge to separate oneself from aversive events,
whereas anger is the urge to attain or regain freedom
of action and control (Frijda, 1986). Because of these
characteristics, words expressing basic emotions are
less likely to be misunderstood or interpreted diþ erently
than those for complex or secondary emotions
(Plutchik, 1994). Therefore, the assessment of primary
or fundamental emotions in competitive sport settings
should facilitate inter-individual comparison. Although
diþ erent lists of basic or primary emotions have been
proposed, it is also true that considerable agreement
exists regarding the fundamental nature of several
emotional states: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, joy,
surprise, interest. Given the above, we suggest that
research on competitive emotions could follow two
parallel lines. The ® rst, initiated by Hanin (1995, 1997),
would focus on the description of a vast set of basic and
complex emotional states that re¯ ect the idiosyncratic
emotional experience and vocabulary of the athlete
(discussed in detail below). The second would examine
the pro® le of basic emotions experienced throughout
competition, and would focus on individual and situ-
ational diþ erences and the factors determining those
diþ erences. We suggest that the integration of the two
approaches could lead to a better understanding of
whether, how and why individuals diþ er in the inter-
pretation of speci® c secondary emotions and their eþ ect
on performance. Moreover, it would also permit the
analysis of intra-individual variations in labelling sec-
ondary emotions with respect to diþ erent competitive
contexts and temporal aspects (e.g. anticipatory anxiety
vs performance anxiety, and post-performance anxiety).
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To illustrate the value of the second line of research,
we report the ® ndings of a study on unidimensional
pre- and post-competitive anxiety and then suggest
how to analyse diþ erences in patterns of pre- and post-
competitive anxiety as sets of basic emotions. Vura
et al. (1985) determined the anxiety of wrestlers 2 days
before and after a competition. They analysed the
eþ ects of winning or losing, favourable versus unfavour-
able draws and judging on the athletes’  anxiety. They
showed that post-competitive anxiety decreased com-
pared with pre-competitive anxiety when favourable
judging was accompanied by good competition results
and when bad competition results were accompanied
by unfavourable judging. Conversely, post-competitive
anxiety showed a relative increase when successful per-
formance was accompanied by unfavourable judging.
The highest post-competitive anxiety was observed
when favourable judging was accompanied by unsuc-
cessful performance. In our view, the results of this
study are not particularly informative. Given the diþ er-
ent circumstances, it is justi® able to hypothesize that
wrestlers who performed badly despite favourable
judging experienced a qualitatively diþ erent pattern
of anxiety ±  if anxiety at all ±  than the type they experi-
enced pre-competition. Although the former scenario
might have triggered feelings of guilt, inward hostility,
tension and maybe fear, the latter might have been
dominated by feelings of worry, interest and expec-
tation. Moreover, we can also hypothesize that the
pattern of post-competitive anxiety experienced by
athletes who did well but encountered unfavourable
judging was diþ erent from that reported by athletes who
were unsuccessful but encountered favourable judging.
Again, although the former might have been dominated
by feelings of anger, the latter probably included feelings
of inward hostility, self-blame and guilt. To elucidate the
® ndings of Vura et al. (1985) further, the relationships
between pre- and post-competitive anxiety as measured
by the State± Trait Anxiety Inventory and pro® les of
primary emotions as measured by the Diþ erential
Emotions Scale-IV should be established. Furthermore,
post-competition patterns of anxiety should be analysed
with respect to such moderators as success versus
failure, favourable versus unfavourable judging and
locus of control.
Temporal patterning of other competitive
aþ ects
Recent research has acknowledged the need to shift the
emphasis from anxiety and stress to a more encompass-
ing concept of `emotion’  in predicting and explaining
psychological and behavioural reactions to environmen-
tal demands (Lazarus, 1993; Gill, 1994; Jones, 1995;
Hanin, 1997; Robazza et al., 1998). According to this
view, analysis of the intensities, qualities, antecedents
and processes of emotions will be more informative
than focusing exclusively on stress (threat, challenge,
harm) and anxiety. Currently, two approaches have
been used ±  nomothetic and idiographic. The ® rst
involves the use of nomothetic standardized scales, is
based on group averages and focuses on inter-individual
and inter-group comparisons. The latter, promoted
by Hanin (1995, 1997), uses individualized scales
with athlete-generated items. This includes sampling
of personally relevant sets of positive and negative
emotions based on the athlete’ s previous performance
experiences.
Many inquiries into the relationship between sport
performance and emotional states have supported
the utility of this latter line of investigation (Cockerill
et al., 1991; Prapavessis and Grove, 1991; Hanin and
Syrj„, 1995; Terry, 1995; Hanin, 1997; Robazza et al.,
1998). However, the predictive validity of pre-
performance aþ ective states seems to depend on the
type of sport, the use of self-referenced performance
criteria and the homogeneity of the participants in
terms of ability and ® tness (Terry, 1995). Indeed,
we hypothesize that individual diþ erences in skill and
® tness will contribute more to sport performance than
variations in emotional states. Accordingly, in circum-
stances in which diþ erences in physical characteristics
are great, the athletes’  pro® les of pre-competitive
emotional states cannot represent a good predictor of
performance outcome. Therefore, the interactional
model of stress (Fig. 1) posits that emotional states will
predict performance based on self-referenced criteria
rather than absolute performance outcome.
Indeed, recent research has con® rmed that self-
referenced performance criteria substantially facilitate
prediction of sport performance from pre-competition
emotional states. Self-referenced performance is based
on athletes’  self-rating of whether they under-performed
or performed to their expectations. Thus, for example,
athletes have to identify their expected ® nish position
1 day before competition. They are then categorized as
having `performed to expectations’  if they ® nish in their
expected position or higher, or as having `under-
performed’  if they do not. Using this method, Terry
(1993) correctly classi® ed 70.9% of performances at
World and Olympic standard on the basis of mood
pro® les in the sports of rowing and bobsledding. In
later studies, replications of this strategy led to 100%
(Hall and Terry, 1995) and 64.7% (Terry, 1995) dis-
criminatory success.
However, the eý ciency of this research strategy seems
to depend on the sport examined. Pre-game mood
pattern showed no discriminatory capability among
the England cricket team during three matches against
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Australia (Terry, 1994). Similarly, pre-performance
scores on the Pro® le of Mood States were not helpful
in predicting performance of a soccer team that played
in the women’s premier league in Sweden (Hassmen
and Blomstrand, 1995). According to Terry (1995)
and Hanin (1995), the con¯ icting results obtained
when examining diþ erent sports are attributable to the
duration of the competition. Rowing, wrestling and
bobsledding last less than 10 min, whereas soccer lasts
90 min and a cricket Test match lasts for 5 days. Since
the probability of mood ¯ uctuations during per-
formance increases with performance duration, the
predictive ability of pre-competition emotional states
will decrease accordingly.
In contrast to the negative reports, Cockerill et al.
(1991) used the Pro® le of Mood States to predict
successfully the cross-country running performance
of experienced male athletes. Race times from two com-
petitive events were plotted against each of the six mood
factors. Using the data from the ® rst race, a multiple-
regression model, which included the interdependence
of tension, anger and depression, was able to predict
rank order of ® nishing position for the second race with
acceptable accuracy. Although these ® ndings may be
speci® c to cross-country running, they nonetheless
prove the utility of examining the quality, intensity and
development of pre-competitive emotional states for the
prediction of athletes’  behaviour and performance.
Indeed, substantial variation between sports in the
desirability of speci® c aþ ective states for performance
is to be expected. Running, a task of low cognitive com-
plexity in which no ® ne motor control is involved,
requires relatively high arousal (Schmidt, 1991). Other
sports of greater cognitive complexity, such as tennis,
archery and fencing, might bene® t from emotional
states accompanied by less physiological arousal.
Moreover, empirical data show that, like cross-country
running (Cockerill et al., 1991), success in karate
appears to be associated with elevated anger (Terry,
1995). The scarcity of such research indicates a need for
further investigations on the diþ erences in desirability
of speci® c emotional states in various sports.
The nomothetic approach
Few nomothetic studies have addressed the temporal
patterning of pre-competitive aþ ect. The ® rst study to
examine changes of mood before a competition com-
pared pre-competitive mood states with basal mood
responses in 115 college rodeo athletes (Meyers et al.,
1990). The diþ erence between pre-competitive and
baseline mood patterns approached statistical signi® -
cance (P < 0.06). Twenty minutes before the rodeo
competition, the athletes reported higher than baseline
tension and vigour, with parallel decreases in depres-
sion, anger and fatigue. Similarly, Szabo and Bak
(1999) showed that collegiate soccer players exhibited
higher positive engagement and revitalization before
competitive matches than before training sessions.
Prapavessis and Grove (1994) administered the
abbreviated version of the Pro® le of Mood States
(Grove and Prapavessis, 1992) to 75 male and 31 female
competitive ri¯ e shooters 48 h, 24 h, 12 h and 15 min
before a competition. Signi® cant time-to-competition
eþ ects were noted for all mood state sub-scales. Ten-
sion and vigour gradually decreased as the competition
approached and then sharply increased just before the
event. Esteem-related aþ ect decreased across the entire
pre-competitive period, with a brisk decline occurring
just before competition. Fatigue decreased from the ® rst
to the second assessment, increased from the second to
the third assessment, and decreased from the third to
the last assessment. Depression increased gradually
in the ® rst three periods and then decreased 15 min
before the competition started. Finally, confusion
and anger remained relatively stable as competition
approached, but 15 min before competition anger
increased while confusion declined. Since this study
was one of only a few to try to determine the temporal
patterning of pre-competitive emotions other than
anxiety, the authors suggested that replicative research
was needed before any valid conclusion could be drawn.
However, despite recent recommendations and calls
for speci® c research (Gill, 1994; Jones, 1995), little
progress has been made over the last 5 years.
The idiographic approach
The individual zones of optimal functioning model
(Hanin, 1997) represents an idiographic approach
and was originally proposed as a tool to determine
competitors’  optimal pre-competitive anxiety. The
model states that the optimal anxiety bandwidth is
speci® c to the individual and that there is great inter-
individual variability in the bandwidth among the
athletes. Hence, pre-competition anxiety has to be
individually examined. Recently, the individual zones
of optimal functioning model has been extended to
pre-competitive emotions other than anxiety.
In the last 5 years, research using the individual zones
of optimal functioning model has focused on positive
and negative aþ ective patterns that facilitate or impair
athletic performance. A framework of ® ve basic dimen-
sions has been proposed to describe what Hanin calls
`psychobiosocial performance states’  and `emotion±
performance relationships’ . Since the detailed descrip-
tion of this model is beyond the scope of this review,
only a brief account of its fundamental ideas and
concepts will be given (for further clari® cation, readers
are referred to Hanin, 1999).
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In Hanin’ s (1999) model, emotions are viewed as the
aþ ective modality (also termed f`orm’  or s`ubstrate’ ) of
the athlete’ s psychobiosocial state. They can be corre-
lated with other modalities (forms or substrates) such as
motivational, cognitive and bodily-somatic. Modality,
form or substrate is one of the ® ve fundamental dimen-
sions of the model. The other dimensions are intensity
(energy), time, context (space) and content (informa-
tion). Intensity typically includes the amount, rate,
frequency, range, zones and pro® le of positive± negative
aþ ect. Positive± negative aþ ect comprises situational,
intra-personal, intra± inter group, organizational and
cross-cultural sub-components that help to relate it to
the setting and environmental aspects of the activity.
The time dimension pertains to the dynamics of
emotions across diþ erent circumstances before, during
and after the performance of a single or several short-
or long-duration tasks (Hanin, 1994). Furthermore,
emotions can refer to past and current experiences or
pertain to future expectations. The content of emotions
is determined by two closely related but independent
factors: the hedonic tone (positivity± negativity or
pleasure± displeasure) and the eþ ect of emotion on
performance. Both positive and negative emotions
can have facilitating, detrimental or both eþ ects on per-
formance, depending on their idiosyncratic meaning.
Therefore, four emotion-content categories derive from
the interaction of the two factors: positive, pleasant,
facilitating emotions; negative, unpleasant, facilitating
emotions; positive, pleasant, debilitating emotions;
negative, unpleasant, debilitating emotions (Hanin,
1997).
The individual zones of optimal functioning approach
advocates the use of individualized scales with athlete-
generated items. It has been suggested that the use of
standardized inventories and self-report scales is not as
pertinent and sensitive to the individual emotional
experience as individualized assessments (Hanin, 1997).
Thus, an emotional pro® le is determined by retro-
spective recall of past performances giving the athlete
a list of emotional states. Then she or he selects from
the list four or ® ve positive emotions and four or
® ve negative emotions that are associated with success-
ful and unsuccessful past performance. Importantly,
the participants can generate personal items when
they feel that the listed items do not describe their
experience.
Research in hockey, soccer, squash and badminton
has shown that athletes report idiosyncratic positive
and negative aþ ect patterns and self-de® ne their
intensity (Hanin and Syrj„, 1995; Hanin, 1997).
These studies also revealed that positive and negative
emotions may be facilitating, debilitating or both,
depending on the individual’ s attributed meaning and
intensity.
Hanin (1997) also examined the content of the most
selected emotions in each of the four categories. The
results obtained on 138 athletes, representing seven
sports (badminton, squash, swimming, cross-country
skiing, soccer, orienteering, ice-hockey), showed that,
for positive aþ ect, the top nine functionally optimal
emotions were energetic, charged, motivated, certain,
con® dent, purposeful, willing, resolute and alert.
Pleasant emotional states such as easy-going, excited,
composed, relaxed, over-joyed, fearless, satis® ed,
exalted and pleasant were most often considered dys-
functional. Unpleasant functionally optimal emotions
included tense, charged, dissatis® ed, attacking,
vehement, intense, nervous, irritated, provoked, angry
and furious. Finally, negative dysfunctional emotions
included tired, unwilling, uncertain, sluggish, depressed,
lazy, distressed, sorrowful, afraid and exhausted.
Because researchers applying the individual zones of
optimal functioning approach have in the main been
interested in the relationship between sport perfor-
mance and emotions experienced immediately before
competition, examination of the temporal patterning of
idiosyncratic pre-competitive emotional states has only
recently been undertaken. Hanin and Syrj„ (1996)
assessed 17 soccer players and observed that their
positive± negative aþ ect scores 1 day before and 30 min
after a competition were signi® cantly diþ erent from pre-
match ratings obtained 40 min before the competition.
Robazza et al. (in press) monitored anxiety com-
ponents, self-con® dence and idiosyncratic emotions
in 13 Italian archers at the 1995 World Champion-
ship, 15 min before practice sessions and competition.
Current aþ ect scores were collected across seven
assessments and contrasted with recalled optimal and
poor performances. The ® rst assessment was per-
formed 2 days before the competition, before a practice
session. The second assessment was performed the
following day, before the oý cial practice. Other assess-
ments were carried out before a competitive event
throughout the Championship. The ® nal assessment
was completed immediately before the individual
elimination round, the most critical stage of the World
Championship. ` Determined’ , ` willing’ , ` focused’ , ` calm’
and `motivated’  were the items most frequently chosen
as facilitating emotions, whereas ` fatigued’ , ` concerned’ ,
`discouraged’  and i`nsecure’  were identi® ed as inhibit-
ing emotions. Notably, `aggressive’ , `calm’  and s`atis-
® ed’  were reported by diþ erent archers as having both
facilitating and debilitating eþ ects on performance.
The study also revealed a consistent pattern of high
correlation on diþ erence scores from the recalled
optimal performance between self-con® dence and
facilitating emotions across assessments. Another con-
sistent pattern of correlations was observed between
the raw scores on worry and tension. However, when the
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absolute diþ erence scores from the recalled optimal
performance were considered, they exhibited diþ erent
temporal patternings. Worry reached its peak in the ® nal
round, whereas tension was slightly below or above
optimum across assessments. Finally, self-con® dence
and positive emotions revealed a similar, relatively
stable, temporal patterning when raw and diþ erence
scores were compared.
The same authors (Robazza et al., 1999, 2000),
using a similar research paradigm, reported two case
studies on two female elite archers. Both athletes chose
`determined’  and `focused’  as facilitating emotions.
However, while one also included the item s`atis® ed’,
the other chose `con® dent’  and `concerned’ . `Dis-
satis® ed’ , ` tense’ , ` worried’  and ` cheerful’  were identi® ed
as inhibiting emotions by one of the athletes; the other
instead chose `discouraged’  and `aggressive’ . Both,
however, agreed that `insecure’  represented a negative
inhibiting emotional state. For one of the archers,
facilitating emotion scores were always inside the opti-
mal zone across the assessments (Robazza et al., 1999).
Only one score for inhibiting emotion intensity was
inside the ineþ ective bandwidth on diþ erent days,
and two of ® ve scores for inhibiting emotion intensity
were within the ineþ ective bandwidth before the oý cial
practice. Because, across the ® ve assessments, only ® ve
scores for inhibiting emotion intensity were inside the
ranges of recalled ineþ ective performance, a good
performance was expected. Indeed, the results con-
® rmed the researchers’  expectations and the archer
performed well in the competition. In the other case
study (Robazza et al., 2000), the archer exhibited
a gradual worsening of her psychological conditions
across the competition. On the days after oý cial
practice, six emotional states were consistently close to
recalled poor performance and were actually followed
by below-average performance. The results presented by
Robazza et al. (1999, 2000, in press) provide compelling
evidence of the practical utility of the idiographic
approach advocated by Hanin (1995, 1997) for predic-
ting athletes’  self-referenced performance.
However, the reasons why diþ erent athletes, even
within the same sport, disagree on the functionality
or dysfunctionality of speci® c emotional states and
their optimal intensity have yet to be explored. We
suggest that an attempt to de® ne secondary emotions
as patterns of basic emotions could shed light on the
individual diþ erences in labelling subjective emotional
states. Furthermore, the relationship between situ-
ational (task characteristics) and personal (personality,
skill) variables and individual optimal intensity of
speci® c emotions should be analysed. For instance,
Larsen and Diener (1987) found that diþ erences in
emotion intensity are highly stable over time and con-
sistent across situations with diþ erent hedonic values.
They showed that individuals scoring high on the Aþ ect
Intensity Measure (Larsen et al., 1986) tended to be
less physiologically aroused, more sociable, more
impulsive and more extravert. Larsen and Diener
(1987) tried to explain these ® ndings using Modulation-
of-Arousal Theory. This theory postulates a common
objective optimal arousal for all individuals. However,
because individuals diþ er in their base arousal, they con-
stantly try to modulate their own arousal to keep it close
to the optimum. According to this theory, aþ ect inten-
sity, extraversion and sensation-seeking originate from
individual diþ erences in base arousal and exemplify
various adjustment mechanisms designed to modulate
arousal in diþ erent ways. Therefore, individuals with
a low base arousal would report fairly high optimal
intensity of arousal, whereas over-aroused individuals
would prefer lower intensities of arousal. However, it is
possible that the two reports refer to exactly the same
objective arousal and that the apparent diþ erences are a
re¯ ection of diþ erent individual bandwidths of arousal
and individual needs. Additionally, recent research has
shown that emotion intensity is a complex construct
involving independent or partially independent com-
ponents (Frijda et al., 1992). Consequently, because we
cannot be sure that participants use a stable criterion in
making intensity judgements, interpretations of assess-
ments based on the emotional intensity dimension have
to be treated with caution.
In addition to intensity, other quantitative dimensions
of emotions can be assessed. It is useful to think of
the overall impact of an emotion not only in terms
of its magnitude but also in terms of its temporal
aspects, such as duration and frequency (Fig. 1).
Frequency and duration of emotional states are dimen-
sions that can be more reliably measured and are far
less in¯ uenced by subjective criteria. Research on
performance-related emotions has examined frequency
and intensity of multidimensional competitive anxiety.
Notably, frequency and intensity are interrelated but
separate dimensions that contribute to the aþ ective
experience. In forming average values of speci® c aþ ects,
it has been suggested that they combine with each other
in an additive manner (Kardum, 1999). Results of
competitive anxiety research have shown that frequency
of negative thoughts (cognitive anxiety) is more variable
across time than intensity and tends to follow the
changes in the intensity of physiological symptoms
(Swain and Jones, 1993; Campbell and Jones, 1997).
Since researchers have in the main been concerned with
emotion intensity, we suggest that future investigations
should examine the temporal dimensions of frequency
and duration of athletes’  emotional experience. Such
an expanded approach would contribute to a clearer
and more reliable picture of athletes’  reaction to
competition.
Temporal patterning of competitive emotions 619
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
6:4
8 0
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
3 
Moderators and antecedents of competition-
related emotional states
As stated earlier, the interactional stress model (Fig. 1)
proposes that the way in which an individual interprets
a competition determines the emotional response. Cog-
nitive appraisals are postulated to be in¯ uenced by the
interaction of personal (e.g. personality characteristics,
sex) and situational (e.g. type of sport, competitive
environment, group cohesion) factors (Jones, 1990).
Recent research on competitive state anxiety has
examined several personal and situational variables
that supposedly moderate and mediate the magnitude
and the temporal patterning of anxiety or its sub-
components as measured with the CSAI-2 (Table 2).
Since this article focuses on the temporal patterns of
emotional states, the current ® ndings related to the
mediators and moderators of the magnitude of pre- and
post-competitive emotional states will not be examined
in detail (for such a discussion, the reader is referred
to Jones, 1995). The discussion below instead revolves
around the interpretation and the description of inter-
actions between time-to-competition and other per-
sonal and situational variables that have been reported
in recent studies. Since researchers have been con-
cerned primarily with competitive anxiety, the discus-
sion will in the main be limited to the moderators of
this speci® c performance-related emotional state.
Sex and gender role endorsement
Sex has been identi® ed as a moderator variable of the
temporal patterning of anxiety in several studies (e.g.
Jones and Cale, 1989; Donzelli et al., 1990; Jones et al.,
1991; Swain and Jones, 1993) (Table 2). Jones and
Cale (1989) found that males showed no changes
on the cognitive and self-con® dence sub-scales of the
CSAI-2 during the pre-competition period. However,
females reported a gradual elevation in scores with a
simultaneous increase in the intensity of the somatic
symptoms and a decline in self-con® dence. The
authors, who adopted a multidimensional view of
anxiety, found it diý cult to explain the obvious corre-
lation between the diþ erent aspects of the anxiety
response reported by female athletes. They sug-
gested that the ® ndings could be related to diþ erences
between the sexes in the willingness to report feelings
of an unpleasant nature and to socialization factors
(Bradburn, 1969; Durkin, 1987). It is also possible that
males tend to interpret the items that form the CSAI-2
cognitive sub-scale in a diþ erent way than females,
giving them a less emotional and more motivational
meaning. Clearly, these hypotheses should be veri® ed
empirically.
In a replication of the study of Jones and Cale (1989),
Jones et al. (1991) found similar diþ erences between
females and males on the cognitive sub-scale. The results
on the other two sub-scales diþ ered slightly from those
obtained in the earlier study; namely, males reported a
reduction in self-con® dence on the day of competition.
The authors proposed that the observed diþ erences
might have arisen because the ® rst study examined
individual sportsmen and women, whereas the latter
included participants from team sports. Indeed, Krane
and Williams (1987) demonstrated that the temporal
patterning of anxiety could be a function of the sport.
The authors observed that, with the approach of com-
petition, golfers reported a reduction in anxiety and an
increase in self-con® dence, whereas gymnasts experi-
enced an increment in anxiety accompanied by a
decrease in self-con® dence. In a more recent investiga-
tion, Slaughter et al. (1994) con® rmed the diþ erential
patterning between males and females on all sub-scales
of the CSAI-2. It would appear that diþ erences in state
competitive anxiety between the sexes is one of the most
consistent ® ndings in such research.
Some researchers have recently shifted their attention
to the relationship between gender role endorsement
and competitive anxiety (Swain and Jones, 1991). They
suggest that a biological distinction between males
and females may not have the same predictive validity
as a distinction based on individuals’  psychological
traits of masculinity and femininity. This standpoint
derives from the cognitive orientation of contemporary
stress models that emphasize the role of personal
characteristics in the cognitive appraisal of the person±
environment relationship (Lazarus and Folkman,
1991). In this case, gender role orientation constitutes
a more ¯ exible and cognitively based concept than
sex. Indeed, research suggests that gender orientation
moderates the pre-competition temporal patterning
of anxiety. In a study by Swain and Jones (1991),
masculine (independent, assertive, forceful) males
remained stable on cognitive anxiety throughout the
pre-competition period, whereas feminine (aþ ectionate,
sympathetic, compassionate) males tended to report
elevated cognitive anxiety as competition neared. Also,
feminine (aþ ectionate, sympathetic, compassionate)
females reported a progressive increase in cognitive
anxiety, whereas that of masculine (independent,
assertive, forceful) females tended to remain relatively
stable (Table 2). These diþ erences suggest that gender
role orientation, as a personality variable, might be more
adequate for describing and predicting competitive
anxiety than biological sex.
Despite their value in predicting athletes’  behaviour
and emotional responses, these ® ndings do not explain
what causes diþ erent patterns of anxiety. Whether the
cause is a diþ erent interpretation of the inventory, the
diý culty in obtaining reliable assessments of unpleasant
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emotions using self-report, the diþ erence in patterns
of motivation in beliefs about oneself and the world that
actually determines the current ® ndings, is still to be
examined. Future research should focus on exploring the
cognitive processes that precede and de® ne the quality
and intensity of emotional reactions to competition.
Skill
Skill has been suggested to help determine the develop-
ment of competitive state anxiety. Gal-or et al. (1986)
examined the temporal patterning of anxiety in 59
orienteers of diþ erent ability. Signi® cant diþ erences
among three ability groups were observed immediately
before the competition, with the less skilled orienteers
exhibiting more state anxiety than their counterparts
(Table 1). It was also observed that better orienteers
exhibited an early increase in anxiety followed by a
decline to a more moderate level before the actual per-
formance. The less skilled group displayed an increase
in state anxiety up to the time when competition started.
Similar results have been reported for diþ erent popu-
lations of athletes by Durtschi and Weiss (1984) and
Campbell and Jones (1995). In contrast, Huddleston
and Gill (1981) failed to ® nd a relationship between
the two variables. However, they concluded that their
results were most probably due to low statistical power
or small diþ erences in skill among the participants.
Sport experience
Although sport experience is probably correlated with
skill, from a scienti® c standpoint it is important to make
a clear distinction between the two. The de® nition
of skill is based on objective individual ability and per-
formance, which in turn aþ ect self-con® dence and self-
eý cacy (Martens et al., 1990). Thus, the relationship
between skill and competitive state anxiety derives
mainly from the mediating eþ ect of perceived self-
eý cacy and self-con® dence (Bandura, 1977). The
notion of sport experience, however, also includes
familiarity or unfamiliarity with the sporting environ-
ment. Perkins and Williams (1994) conducted a
study of the eþ ects of a complete lack of speci® c sport
experience on state anxiety. The CSAI-2 was repeatedly
administered to experienced and novice abseilers before
three consecutive descents. Although no diþ erence
between the two groups was observed 1 week before the
® rst descent, an increase in the cognitive and somatic
aspects of anxiety in novice abseilers was apparent 24 h
before the event. The diþ erences disappeared in the
subsequent trials. In this case, the unfamiliarity with
the sport and the risks involved in abseiling exerted a
substantial eþ ect on the athletes’  state anxiety. It is
probable that the same principle applies to competition.
For example, the time-course of competitive anxiety
may also depend on the athletes’  familiarity with com-
petition in general or with speci® c competition settings
(e.g. standard of competition, place of competition).
However, research has yet to be conducted to elucidate
this.
It is important to emphasize that the relationship
between sport experience and competitive anxiety often
yields contrasting results. For example, Gould et al.
(1984) found no relationship between sport experience
and competitive state anxiety in a sample of 63 female
volleyball players. They ascribed this to the restricted
range of experience and the sport studied. In contrast,
Donzelli et al. (1990) observed that anxiety increased
in non-elite runners in parallel with their experience.
These researchers attributed the ® ndings to the most
experienced runners also being the most successful
and, therefore, supposedly the most committed in their
sample. It is possible that the less experienced and
less successful runners viewed the race as being less
important than their more successful counterparts.
Success vs failure
Performance outcome undoubtedly aþ ects an athlete’ s
emotional experience (Martens and Gill, 1976). In
support of this contention, Caruso et al. (1990)
observed a signi® cant increase in cognitive anxiety
from pre-competition to post-competition in condi-
tions of failure, but a decrease in conditions of success.
Notably, somatic anxiety increased in both conditions.
Self-con® dence decreased in the failure condition,
but remained stable among participants experiencing
success. As noted earlier, Vura et al. (1985) also noted
an increase in state anxiety in elite wrestlers after a poor
performance. However, the eþ ect of failure was also
mediated by the quality of judging. A relative increase
in state anxiety was noted when good competition
results were coupled with unfavourable judging; the
greatest post-competition anxiety occurred when a bad
performance was accompanied by favourable judging.
We can assume that the latter circumstances constituted
a greater threat to the athletes’  self-esteem and,
consequently, yielded greater post-performance anxiety.
The eþ ect of performance outcome on an athlete’ s
psychological state not only depends on situational
factors, but also on personality traits. As noted earlier,
Hall (1980) showed that locus of control mediates
the emotional response to failure and success in com-
petitive events. Internals are aþ ected much more by
unfavourable outcomes than externals.
Type of sport
An athlete’ s aþ ective response to competition is thought
to depend also on the characteristics and requirements
Temporal patterning of competitive emotions 621
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
6:4
8 0
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
3 
of their sport (Krane and Williams, 1987; Martens et al.,
1990; Jones et al., 1991; Hassmen and Blomstrand,
1995). Research has indicated that individual-based
sports tend to produce more competitive anxiety than
team sports, as do subjectively scored and non-contact
sports (Martens et al., 1990). Moreover, diþ erent sports
appear to require diþ erent patterns of desirable pre-
competitive aþ ective states (Friend and LeUnes,
1990; Cockerill et al., 1991; Prapavessis and Grove,
1994; Terry, 1995). Future research should try to
determine the similarities and diþ erences in the pre-
competitive patterns of emotional states in various
sports and diþ erent tasks within individual sports.
Personality characteristics
Stable personal characteristics that have been shown
to be signi® cant in determining the temporal pattern of
competitive anxiety include gender role orientation
(Swain and Jones, 1991), competitive trait anxiety
(Huband and McKelvie, 1986; Donzelli et al., 1990),
perfectionism (Hall et al., 1998) and locus of control
(Hall, 1980). Donzelli et al. (1990) reported similar
state anxiety in high and low trait-anxious athletes 1
week before competition, but more intense anxiety in the
high trait-anxious group on the post-competition assess-
ments. In examining team sports athletes, Huband
and McKelvie (1986) noted that the anxiety of low trait-
anxious athletes did not change 1 day before, just before
and 1 day after the event, whereas that of highly anxious
athletes peaked just before the competition. The anxiety
decreased in both groups just after and 1 day after the
competition.
Hall et al. (1998) examined the links between perfec-
tionism, achievement goals and the temporal patterning
of multidimensional state anxiety in 119 school runners.
They reported that perfectionism was a signi® cant pre-
dictor of cognitive anxiety. Perceived ability predicted
con® dence, while ego and task goals predicted cognitive
anxiety and con® dence, respectively. Participants
with high scores on perfectionism reported signi® cantly
more cognitive anxiety on all four assessments than
those exhibiting low perfectionism scores. Furthermore,
these diþ erences became more prominent as the com-
petition approached (see Table 2).
Several other personality characteristics have been
examined for their eþ ect on the magnitude of com-
petitive state anxiety (e.g. Jones and Swain, 1992; Yang
and Pargman, 1993), but not for the time-course of pre-
competitive anxiety. As far as other pre-competitive
emotional states are concerned, Prapavessis and Grove
(1994) examined several individual general dispositions,
which have been theoretically or empirically linked
with emotionality and could moderate an athlete’ s
pre-competitive mood response. Self-handicapping,
trait-sport con® dence, hardiness and neuroticism were
found to exert a signi® cant main eþ ect on various mood
states, but no interaction with time-to-competition
was observed. The paucity of ® ndings in this ® eld of
research suggests a need for further investigation.
Cognitive factors
Cognitive appraisal is postulated to determine the
athlete’ s emotional response to competition (Fig. 1).
Recent research has focused on uncovering the cogni-
tive and evaluative processes that precede the onset and
modulate the course of competitive state anxiety.
According to the multidimensional theory of anxiety,
the antecedents of cognitive anxiety and self-con® dence
are hypothesized to be related to perceived importance
(Marchant et al., 1998) and uncertainty of outcome.
The latter would include perceptions of one’ s own and
one’ s opponent’ s ability and the external competitive
environment. However, recent research has indicated
that threat of defeat is more important for state anxiety,
not uncertainty about the outcome (Cooley, 1987;
Jones et al., 1991; Prapavessis et al., 1996; Marchant
et al., 1997). For example, Marchant et al. (1997)
reported higher concern among golfers who were
certain to lose than among those who were less certain.
Notably, the somatic aspect of anxiety, as measured by
the CSAI-2, did not diþ er ±  apart from the last assess-
ment ±  between highly unpredictable, highly predictable
positive and highly predictable negative conditions. This
again reinforces doubts of the utility and discriminant
validity of the somatic sub-scale of the CSAI-2.
Antecedents of somatic anxiety are thought to be of
shorter duration and to consist mainly of conditioned
responses to stimuli, such as pre-competition routines
(Martens et al., 1990). Although there appears to be no
dispute regarding the duration of the somatic symptoms
(e.g. Slaughter et al., 1994; Marchant et al., 1997),
no evidence has been found for the hypothesized
antecedents (Jones et al., 1991; Lox, 1992; Hanton and
Jones, 1995; Lane et al., 1997). Overall, the cognitive
antecedents of the various aspects of anxiety tend to
vary depending on sex (Jones et al., 1991; Slaughter
et al., 1994), sport (Hanton and Jones, 1995) and skill
(cf. Jones, 1995). For example, antecedents in females
are related more to personal goals and standards,
whereas males tend to react to interpersonal com-
parison (Jones et al., 1991). Moreover, the diþ erent
sub-scales sometimes do and sometimes don’ t share
similar antecedents (Lox, 1992; Lane et al., 1997),
indicating that the multidimensional theory of anxiety
may not constitute the best approach for explaining and
exploring athletes’  responses to competition.
The equivocal ® ndings of the relationship between
competitive state anxiety and other variables are an
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indication of the complexity of the relationship.
Obviously, many interacting moderators and mediators
determine the magnitude and time-course of com-
petitive aþ ects, making accurate prediction diý cult
(Fig. 1). Another probable reason why this appears to
be so intricate is the lack of precision in de® ning and
measuring anxiety.
Conclusions
Stress is a complex process that unfolds over time
and is characterized by continuous change. An inter-
actional model of competitive stress that integrates
current research on competitive aþ ects and emphasizes
the temporal aspects of the stress process has been pro-
posed (Fig. 1). Close inspection of the literature reveals
that there has been little research on the temporal
aspects and moderators of nomothetic and idiographic
performance-related emotions other than anxiety.
Investigation has focused mainly on emotion intensity,
neglecting temporal dimensions such as frequency and
duration of emotions. Researchers have in the main
been concerned with the athlete’ s emotional experience
before a single competition, neglecting the temporal
changes in aþ ectivity related to longer periods, such as
seasons, tournaments and phases of an athlete’ s career,
and post-competition.
Equivocal ® ndings on temporal patterning and inter-
pretation of competitive anxiety indicate the need to
develop a more conceptually explicit de® nition of this
particular performance-related emotional state. Most
emotion theorists consider anxiety to be a complex
secondary emotion. Since words expressing basic
emotions are less likely to be misunderstood or inter-
preted diþ erently, the analysis of competitive anxiety
and other complex emotions as a set of patterns of basic
emotions has been proposed.
We propose that, for the sake of a thorough and
deeper understanding of athletes’  experience and
behaviour, research on competitive aþ ects should be
based on the integration of two approaches. The ® rst,
the idiographic approach, focuses on the idiosyncratic
emotional experience and vocabulary of the athlete.
This approach deals with the ® nal product (verbal
reports of idiosyncratic emotional experiences) of
unique individual `psychobiosocial’  conditions and is
of indisputable practical value. The second, mainly
nomothetic approach, is centred on the analysis of
basic emotions throughout the stress process and deals
with inter-individual comparison, but also permits the
analysis of intra-individual variations in labelling
secondary emotions in diþ erent phases of competition.
We hope that the integration of the two approaches will
shed light on whether, how and why individuals diþ er
in the interpretation of the meaning and functionality
of speci® c secondary performance-related emotions.
Finally, these improvements in the assessment of
emotional states should facilitate the analysis of the
stress process and all its temporal aspects.
Athletes’  emotional response to competitive stress
is determined by their subjective interpretation or
appraisal, which, in turn, is in¯ uenced by various
situational (e.g. type of sport, standard of competition,
interpersonal relationships) and personal factors (e.g.
sex, age, skill, motivation). To date, research has focused
primarily on the moderators of competitive anxiety.
Very little has been done to identify the factors that
moderate other competition-related emotional states.
In this regard, the proposed model of stress (Fig. 1) is
meant to provide some ideas for future research.
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